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Foreword 
 
Access to and use of broadband service is a goal and focus of our organization since our 
founding in Kentucky a decade ago, and we have seen firsthand in over 30 states in the U.S. the 
transformational ability of broadband Internet service to improve the quality of life for 
individuals and communities, as well as the benefits to our economy realized by increased 
broadband adoption rates. 
 
Ubiquitous broadband availability continues to be an issue both in Kentucky and across the 
nation. National estimates of the National Broadband Map show that broadband at the lowest 
speeds is available to most U.S. households, but there remain millions who cannot subscribe to 
broadband even if they want it. 
 
Furthermore, initial broadband availability must be followed by continued investment and re-
investment in that same network, to maintain its current capabilities and provide for the 
modernization necessary to increase the network‟s capacity for more end-users and faster overall 
speeds. 
 
The National Broadband Plan was released by the Federal Communications Commission in 
February of 2010 and established broad goals for U.S. broadband availability in the short-term 
and long-term that includes speeds significantly faster than are available to all U.S. households 
today. The FCC, as part of many policy recommendations designed to foster fast and efficient 
broadband deployment, established a recommendation calling for the reform of current 
telecommunications policies or programs such as the federal Universal Service Fund and 
Intercarrier Compensation. 
 
Access reform is a sub-part of the larger Intercarrier Compensation regime, for which the 
National Broadband Plan observed: “[t]he current per-minute [Intercarrier Compensation] 
system was never designed to promote deployment of broadband networks” (being that the 
current system was designed to assist long-distance voice telephone providers in compensating 
each other for long-distance phone calls) and that “[t]he current ICC system is not sustainable in 
an all-broadband Internet (IP) world.”  
 
The FCC further established in the National Broadband Plan that, “[b]ecause providers‟ [a]ccess 
rates are above costs, the current [ICC] system creates disincentives to migrate to all IP-based 
networks. […] While this may be in the short-term interest of a carrier seeking to retain ICC 
revenues, it actually hinders the transformation of America‟s networks to broadband,” and “even 
rate-of-return carriers…acknowledge that the current system is „not sustainable‟ and could lead 
to a „death spiral...‟” 
 
While an order reforming the USF and ICC is under review at the FCC, it may take some time 
before the Commission is able to act, and it is for that reason that we were part of a broad effort 
in Kentucky last year encouraging the Public Service Commission to open a proceeding 
reforming the access charge system that has been in place in Kentucky since 1984. In short, we 
encouraged the PSC not to wait on reform to come from Washington, DC but to join many other 
states in beginning that reform itself. 
 3 
We seek accurate data and knowledge in all broadband related issues, and the encouragement we 
offered to the Kentucky PSC last year led to the desire to obtain research into the economic 
benefits of reforming the access rate system in Kentucky. The study below by the University of 
Kentucky‟s Center for Business and Economic Research is the result. 
 
It is our hope that this study can be a useful resource for policy-makers and broadband 
stakeholders in the Commonwealth as they work to reform the systems necessary to keep 
Kentucky‟s telecommunications providers vibrant and foster increased broadband availability 
across the state. 
 
Connected Nation, Inc. 
July 25, 2011 
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Executive Summary 
 
This report examines the economic consequences of the current access rate system for intrastate 
long-distance calls, governed by the Kentucky Public Service Commission.  At the time 
Kentucky created an access rate system for telephone service in 1984, the main goal of 
telecommunication policy was universal wireline access.  Since then the telecommunications 
landscape has changed dramatically, as well as current policy goals.  New forms of 
communication and policy have emerged such as cellular phones and cable telephony, as well as 
the introduction of the National Broadband Plan and the strong desire both nationally and in 
Kentucky for ubiquitous broadband availability.  Economic theory, along with expert testimony, 
suggests that the current access system is not socially optimal. 
 
Switched access charges are prices that local telephone service providers charge wireline long-
distance providers for connecting long-distance calls to their local exchange customers.  A long-
distance call can be categorized as one of two types, interstate or intrastate.  The former is a 
long-distance call between individuals in different states, while the latter is a long-distance call 
between individuals in the same state.  Interstate access rates are governed by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), while intrastate access rates are regulated by the Kentucky 
Public Service Commission.  An economic inefficiency exists with this system because intrastate 
access charges are not set at the same price as interstate access charges, even though there is no 
difference to the provider for the cost of the service. 
 
Additionally, the FCC has identified reform of this system, as well as other related programs or 
policies, as key to reforming the telecommunications investment landscape in the U.S. to allow 
and incentivize further deployment of broadband networks to reach unserved households and 
businesses.  
 
Major findings of the report are: 
 Each of the states bordering Kentucky has addressed intrastate access rate reform.  Illinois, 
Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia have individually 
implemented policy to decrease intrastate access charges.  Several states have gone as far as 
requiring providers‟ intrastate access rates to mirror their interstate access rates, which are 
governed by the FCC, while others have been less aggressive but still requiring providers to 
lower their rates.  Kentucky has not revisited access reform since 1999 and is the only state 
in the region which has failed to address intrastate access reform. 
 There are economically sound reasons why two products with similar functionality and 
similar costs—intrastate and interstate long-distance connection services to local 
exchanges—should have similar prices.   
 Higher access charges lead to higher prices to consumers for intrastate long-distance 
services, as well as higher prices for goods whose production processes require intrastate 
long-distance communication.   
 Inefficiently high access charges reduce competition in the intrastate long-distance market, 
and they lead to suboptimal investment in the present and the future.   
 A final economic inefficiency of the current access charge system is that it creates arbitrage 
opportunities by charging different prices for essentially the same product, resulting in 
wasteful spending that could be avoided. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Telecommunications policy throughout most of the twentieth century was driven by the goal of 
universal access—a goal formally established by the Communications Act of 1934.  To 
accomplish that goal long-distance telephone rates were explicitly set above cost for many 
decades, and the profits were used to cross-subsidize rates for local telephone service that were 
set below cost.  Competitive long-distance providers began to challenge AT&T‟s monopoly in 
the 1970‟s, leading to the breakup of the AT&T system in the mid 1980‟s.  After the Bell 
Operating Companies were divested from AT&T, they continued to provide local telephone 
service while AT&T provided long-distance service in competition with MCI, Sprint, and others. 
 
With the advent of broadband internet services, the information technology market has 
transformed itself since the early 1990‟s, and in the 21st century universal access to broadband is 
assuming the same, if not higher, level of prominence.  Importantly, broadband Internet services 
allow for more than simple voice communication, and have brought changes to the U.S. 
economy, education and health-care system. 
 
At the time of the AT&T break-up, local wireline telephone service was still a monopoly, 
provided by incumbent local exchange carriers (ILEC‟s), even though long-distance carriers 
were beginning to compete with one another for customers.  Interstate telephone rates came 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), but regulation of 
intrastate rates fell to the various state public service commissions.  Thus, the rate charged to a 
long-distance carrier by a local telephone exchange carrier to connect an interstate call was 
regulated by the FCC, while the rate charged by the same local telephone exchange carrier to 
connect a long-distance call that originated within the state was (and is) regulated by the state. 
 
In response to this sea-change in the telecommunication environment, Kentucky created an 
access rate system for telephone service in 1984.  The system of intrastate switched access 
charges established subsidies that gave financial incentives for ILEC‟s to provide landline 
service to hard-to-reach customers, so that all Kentuckians would have access to landline phone 
service at “reasonable” rates.  This system of implicit subsidies was created at a point in time 
when local residential and commercial customers had only one telephone option for connecting 
to the outside world—their local wireline provider. 
 
Other than the changes it approved to BellSouth‟s access charges in 1999, the Kentucky Public 
Service Commission (PSC) has not revised the implicit subsidy mechanisms built into access 
charges for intrastate (i.e. within-state) long-distance calls since then.
1
  In contrast, the FCC has 
made several changes in its regulation of interstate long-distance calls, rebalancing revenues 
away from carrier (access) charges to end-user charges.
2,3
  The result is that many customers pay 
                                                 
1
 Order, In the Matter of the Tariff Filing of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. to Mirror Interstate Access Rates, 
before the Kentucky Public Service Commission, Case No. 98-065, (March 31, 1999); Order, In the Matter of: 
Application of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., d/b/a South Central Bell Telephone to Modify Its Method of 
Regulation, before the Kentucky Public Service Commission, Case No. 94-121 (August 2, 1999). 
2
 Order on Remand and Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In the Matter of High-Cost 
Universal Service Support and Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service et al., before the Federal 
Communications Commission, FCC 08-262, (released November 5, 2008), (hereafter FCC 08-262). 
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substantially more in per-minute charges for intrastate long-distance calls than for interstate 
long-distance distance calls, as illustrated in the figures and tables in the next section. 
 
The Kentucky PSC has initiated an investigation into the intrastate switched access rates charged 
by incumbent and competitive local exchange carriers in the state.
4
  This analysis paper is 
motivated by that investigation.  The first part of our analysis provides a general overview of 
long-distance access charges.  The second section summarizes recent changes in other states‟ 
access rate systems, including other states in the southeastern U.S. such as Georgia and 
Tennessee.  The third section provides an overview of the underlying economic principles 
associated with the access rate system, highlighting economic inefficiencies that exist in the 
current system where prices for functionally identical products—interstate and intrastate access 
charges—are allowed to differ substantially. 
 
II. Overview of Long-Distance Access Charges 
 
From the days of Alexander Graham Bell until the 1970‟s, voice communication between 
persons in different locations flowed over copper wires in one nationally-interconnected system.  
The advent of wireless communication devices and the internet over the past several decades 
have drastically changed the current possibilities.  Now one person may initiate a telephone call 
from a cell phone that taps into a copper or fiber-optic long-distance system and ends up 
connecting with another person who receives the call through an internet connection.  Three or 
more different telephone service providers may be involved in completing the call.  It is 
impractical for all three providers to bill the customer separately for the services each provides, 
necessitating a system of reimbursement among companies. 
 
What are long-distance access charges?  These charges, also known as switched access charges, 
are the prices that local telephone service providers charge wireline long-distance providers for 
connecting long-distance calls to their local exchange customers.  Local exchange providers fall 
into two groups, incumbent local exchange carriers (ILEC‟s) and competitive local exchange 
carriers (CLEC‟s).5  Wireline long-distance providers are known as interexchange carriers 
(IXC‟s).  The originating and terminating LEC‟s incur costs when a long-distance call is placed, 
and they are allowed to charge the IXC for the origination and termination services provided.  
The costs that the LEC‟s incur in connecting a long-distance call do not differ by where the call 
is going or where it comes from.  However, the amount the LEC‟s charge the IXC for access to 
their systems can differ greatly depending on whether the call crosses state boundaries. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
3
 Sixth Report and Order in CC Docket Nos. 96-262 and 94-1; Report and Order in CC Docket No. 99-249; 
Eleventh Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-45; commonly referred to as CALLS (Coalition for Affordable 
Local and Long Distance Service) Order; Federal Communications Commission, May 31, 2000. 
4
 An Investigation into the Intrastate Switched Access Rates of All Kentucky Incumbent and Competitive Local 
Exchange Carriers, before the Kentucky Public Service Commission, Case No. 2010-00398. 
5
 Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers are the companies (or their successor companies) originally franchised by the 
Kentucky Public Service Commission as the sole provider of local telephone service within a specific geographic 
area.  After the industry was deregulated by Telecommunications Act of 1996, several companies may offer service 
in a single area.  New companies that have entered the market are called Competitive Local Exchange Carriers.  See 
Kentucky Public Service Commission, “Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,” August 27, 2007. 
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To illustrate the difference a state boundary can make in these charges, consider a call from one 
individual in Lexington, KY to another individual in Cave City, KY.  Suppose the person making 
the call has Windstream as their local wireline carrier and Verizon as their long-distance carrier, 
and the person receiving the call has the South Central Rural Telephone Cooperative as their 
local wireline carrier.  Because Verizon does not have a connection to either customer, it must 
pay a long-distance access fee to Windstream for initiating the call as well as to the South 
Central Rural Telephone Cooperative for terminating the call.  These charges are intercarrier 
charges from one telephone carrier to another—the customers are not billed directly, and the 
charges we discuss are made on a per-minute basis. 
 
Although the access services provided by the ILEC are identical regardless of the distance 
between the callers, the price that Verizon pays for these services is determined by whether the 
calling and called parties are in the same state or in different states.  If they are in different states, 
then the access charges are interstate access charges, which are regulated by the Federal 
Communications Commission.  If they are both in Kentucky, the access charges are intrastate 
access charges, which are regulated by the Kentucky Public Service Commission (PSC). 
 
The access charges also differ according to the types of phones used by the originating and 
terminating parties.  Wireline phones are treated differently than cellular phones, cable 
telephony, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services, such as Skype, Vonage, or Google 
Voice.  Wireless calls are treated as local calls as long as they do not cross the boundaries of a 
Major Trading Area (MTA), and hence do not incur access charges.
6
  Since almost all of 
Kentucky falls within MTA #26, the large majority of wireless calls within the state do not incur 
intrastate switched access charges.  The pricing structure for cable and other types of VoIP calls 
varies from provider to provider, particularly with respect to terminating charges.  The provider 
of such calls, such as Insight or Vonage, may route the calls on its own network or may use 
another long-distance carrier.  In general, it should be noted that the functional service provided 
by the LEC does not differ across each of these telephone calling methods. 
 
The following example illustrates the effect this differential treatment of different forms of a 
phone call has on the access charges levied by the LEC‟s.  Figure 1 shows the difference in 
access charges for a ten-minute call from Lexington, KY to a wireline phone in Shepherdsville, 
KY based on two different types of originating phone devices in Lexington: (1) wireline with 
Windstream; (2) wireless with AT&T.  For comparison, we also include a VoIP call using Skype 
from a computer in Lexington to a computer in Shepherdsville.  The access charges include 
originating and terminating charges with the goal of making an “apples to apples” comparison on 
all three calls.
7
   
                                                 
6 MTAs are boundaries that segment the country for telecommunication licensing purposes. MTAs are based on 
Rand McNally‟s Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide. 
7
 Specifically, the access charges are based on AT&T‟s April 21, 2010 filing in KY PSC Case No. 2010-00162 that 
were modeled from readily accessible, publicly-available tariffs.  As described in Exhibit D of the AT&T filing, the 
calls originating from landlines assume 50% originating and terminating, 20% tandem usage, tandem facilities 
mileage at 10 miles, and “direct access” rates where applicable.  Cost calculations also include, where applicable, 
common carrier line, local switching, information surcharge, interconnection charge, common port, common 
transport, tandem transport, and tandem switching.  The wireless call from Lexington to Shepherdsville is an intra-
MTA call, and we assume that it is covered under the reciprocal compensation terms of the agreement between 
AT&T wireless service and Verizon South (now owned by Windstream), with a rate of $0.0007 per minute.  The 
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Figure 1: Long-Distance Access Charges for Calls to Shepherdsville, Kentucky 
 
Call from Lexington, KY to landline in Shepherdsville, KY   Cost of 10-minute call 
(1) Call from landline phone in Lexington to Shepherdsville   $1.10 
(2) Call from wireless phone in Lexington to Shepherdsville   $0.007 
(3) Call from Skype computer in Lexington to Skype computer in Shepherdsville $0.00 
 
Call from Seymour, IN to landline in Shepherdsville, KY   Cost of 10-minute call 
(1) Call from landline phone in Seymour to Shepherdsville    $0.15 
(2) Call from wireless phone in Seymour to Shepherdsville    $0.10 
(3) Call from Skype computer in Seymour to Skype computer in Shepherdsville $0.00 
 
As can be seen, the highest access charge of approximately $1.10 is for a call from a landline in 
Lexington.  The access charge for a call from the wireless phone with AT&T service is $0.007 
                                                                                                                                                             
wireless call from Seymour to Shepherdsville uses the per-minute rate for interstate calls from AT&T‟s Exhibit C of 
its April 21, 2010 filing, 2010.  The actual rate may be lower because these rates include other charges in addition to 
the access charges. 
Lexington, KY 
Seymour, IN 
Shepherdsville, KY 
80 miles 80 miles 
 9 
based on a $0.0007 per-minute reciprocal compensation rate as articulated in the interconnection 
agreement between the two providers filed with the PSC.  We assume that a call from Skype 
(VoIP provider) does not enter the PTSN network and therefore does not incur any access 
charges. 
 
To illustrate the difference a state boundary makes in access charges, Figure 1 also shows the 
access charge for a call from Seymour, IN to Shepherdsville, KY.  Although the distance 
between Seymour and Shepherdsville is approximately the same as that between Lexington and 
Shepherdsville (80 miles), the call is an interstate call subject to FCC-regulated interstate tariffs.  
Thus, the estimated access charge of a ten-minute call between Seymour and Shepherdsville is 
$0.15 when the caller in Seymour is using a landline and $0.10 when the caller in Seymour is 
using a wireless phone.  Again, we assume that the Skype call does not enter the PTSN network 
and therefore incurs no access charges.  This example clearly illustrates that local telephone 
companies impose different access fees for different types of calls even though the functionality 
of the service provided—connecting a call from an outside source—is identical across the 
different types of calls shown in the figure. 
 
 
Access charges differ considerably across local exchange carriers in Kentucky.  Figure 2 
illustrates the different interstate and intrastate long-distance access charges of Kentucky‟s rural 
local exchange carriers (RLEC‟s), and Table 1 lists the intrastate long-distance access charges of 
Kentucky‟s competitive local exchange carriers (CLEC‟s).  It can be seen that intrastate access 
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 
WINDSTREAM KENTUCKY EAST, INC-LEXINGTON
WINDSTREAM KENTUCKY EAST, INC - LONDON
WINDSTREAM KENTUCKY WEST, INC.
CINCINNATI BELL - OH
LESLIE COUNTY TEL CO, INC. (TDS)
SALEM TELEPHONE COMPANY (TDS)
LEWISPORT TELEPHONE COMPANY (TDS)
SOUTH CENTRAL RURAL TEL COOP
BRANDENBURG TEL CO
FOOTHILLS RURAL TEL COOP CORP
MOUNTAIN RURAL TEL COOP CORP INC
WEST KY RURAL TEL COOP CORP, INC
DUO COUNTY TEL COOP INC
HIGHLAND TEL COOP -KY
PEOPLES RURAL TEL COOP CORP
THACKER-GRIGSBY TELEPHONE CO., INC.
NORTH CENTRAL TEL COOP - KY
GEARHEART DBA COALFIELDS TEL.CO
LOGAN TEL COOP INC
BALLARD RURAL TEL COOP CORP INC
Intrastate Rate cents/min Interstate Rate cents/min
Access Rates (cents per min)
Figure 2: Kentucky RLEC Intrastate and Interstate Switched Access Rates 
Source: AT&T 2010-00162, Exhibit C. 
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fees vary greatly (by a factor of over twenty) across providers, from over $0.09 per minute for 
Brandenburg Telephone Company (Figure 2) to $0.0043 per minute for Metropolitan 
Communications (Table 1).  The interstate access fees are much more similar across carriers, 
with most carriers charging around $0.02 per minute. 
 
Table 1: Kentucky CLEC Blended Intrastate Access Rate Per Minute: 
 
Source: AT&T 2010-00162, Exhibit D. 
Kentucky CLEC
Blended 
Intrastate 
ARPM
Nuvox Communications (Clear Access) $.0762
Cinergy MetroNet $.0748
Norlight (a/k/a Cinergy Communications) $.0748
Business Telecom (Indirect Access) $.0655
SouthEast Tel. Co. $.0643
Dialog Telecommunications $.0637
Business Telecom (Direct Access) $.0630
Insight Phone (Zone 4) $.0556
Nuvox Communications (Direct Access) $.0514
Access Point $.0454
BullsEye Telecom $.0410
USLEC $.0394
XO Communications $.0304
Sprint Communications $.0286
YMax Communications $.0275
Brandenburg Telecom $.0272
South Central Telcom $.0272
North Central Communications $.0272
Insight Phone (Zone 1,2,3,5) $.0262
Telcove $.0206
Level 3 $.0205
Ernest Communications $.0200
Armstrong Telecommunications $.0147
tw telecom (Cincinnati markets) $.0126
MCIMetro Access Transmission Services (Direct Connect) $.0103
tw telecom (Lexington, Louisville markets) $.0102
MCIMetro Access Transmission Services (Tandem Connect) $.0097
TCG $.0067
Comcast Phone $.0067
Cavalier $.0067
Birch Telecom $.0067
Sage Telecom $.0067
Metropolitan Telecommunications $.0043
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Even though local telephone companies often have a virtual monopoly on access to their wireline 
customers, particularly in rural areas, the number of landlines and the number of calls made to 
those landlines have been decreasing over time as customers continue to substitute other forms of 
communications, including wireless phones and VoIP such as Insight Phone and Vonage.  The 
FCC documents that the number of wireline phone lines in Kentucky provided by incumbent 
local exchanges (ILEC‟s) dropped from nearly 1.7 million at the end of 2007 to approximately 
1.3 million in June 2010, a decrease of 21.5 percent.
8,9
  In contrast, the number of wireless 
subscribers in the Commonwealth grew from 3,291,000 to 3,654,000 over the same period, an 
increase of 11percent.
10
  And as of June 2010, there were approximately 260,000 VoIP phone 
lines in Kentucky.
11
  
 
III. Recent Access Reforms in Other States 
 
Table 2 illustrates that each of the states bordering Kentucky has addressed intrastate access 
charge reform in varying degrees.  Illinois, Indiana, and West Virginia currently require 
providers to set their intrastate access charges to mirror their interstate access charges.  Indiana is 
the clear leader in the region for reform, with the passage of HEA 1279 in March 2006.  This bill 
served as the catalyst for telecommunications reform in Indiana and is considered the benchmark 
for other states interested in deregulation.  Regarding intrastate access service, this legislation 
states that rates for intrastate switched or special access service are “just and reasonable” if 
intrastate rates mirror interstate rates for switched or special access service.  
 
Illinois, Tennessee, and West Virginia have followed Indiana‟s lead with recently passed 
legislation requiring their providers to set intrastate rates to mirror interstate rates.  In December 
2010 Illinois passed PUA Section 13-900.2, requiring each telecommunications carrier providing 
Illinois switched access service to reduce their rates to mirror their interstate rates by July 1, 
2012.   
 
West Virginia has also set legislation in motion, but it is not as uniform as Indiana and Illinois.  
Traffic-sensitive intrastate switched access rates in West Virginia are being lowered to the 
interstate level for most of the state as a result of several WV Public Service Commission orders.  
This is being phased in over different periods of time depending on whether the carrier is an 
ILEC or a CLEC.  
 
In April 2011, Tennessee House Bill No. 574 amended Senate Bill No. 598 concerning intrastate 
access rates.  Any entity providing switched access service is prohibited from charging intrastate 
access charges that exceed the interstate switched access charges.  There are several ways 
providers can choose to progress to this outcome, but intrastate rates cannot exceed interstate 
rates by April 1, 2016.  
                                                 
8
 Federal Communications Commission. September 2010. Trends in Telephone Service. Industry Analysis and 
Technology Division Wireline Competition Bureau. 
9 Federal Communications Commission. March 2011. Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2010. 
Industry Analysis and Technology Division Wireline Competition Bureau. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
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Table 2: Recent Intrastate Access Reforms in Kentucky and Surrounding States 
 
 
Addressed 
Access Rate 
Reform
Access Rate 
Legislation Summary of Legislation
Kentucky No
Kentucky has not 
revised access 
reform since 1999.
…
Surrounding States
Illinois Yes
Illinois Public 
Utilities Act 
Section 13-900.2
By July 1, 2012, each telecommunications carrier must 
reduce its intrastate switched access rates to miror its 
then current interstate switched access rates and rate 
structure.
Indiana Yes HEA 1279
Rates and charges for intrastate switched or special 
access service are considered to be just and reasonable if 
the intrastate rates and charges mirror the providers 
interstate rates and charges for switched or special 
access service.
Missouri Yes House Bill 1750
Beginning March 1, 2011 House Bill 1750 requires large 
ILECs to annually reduce their intrastate access rates by 
six percent of the difference between their intrastate and 
interstate access rates. This reduction will be completed 
over a period of three years.
Ohio Yes
Case No. 10-2387-
TP-COI
The intrastate access rates of mid-sized and small ILECs 
have been frozen at their 1997 levels. This commission 
ordered investigation would reduce the intrastate access 
charges for the carriers to their interstate levels.
Tennessee Yes House Bill 574
Any entity providing switched access service is prohibited 
from charging intrastate access charges that exceeds the 
interstate switched access charges. There are several 
ways providers can choose to progress to this outcome, 
but intrastate rates cannot exceed interstate rates by 
April 1, 2016. 
Virginia Yes
Case No. PUC-
2003-00091
Verizon was ordered to reduce intrastate access charges 
by August 1, 2005 and again on February 1, 2006.
West 
Virginia
Yes
Case No. 06-1935-
T-PC and 05-0040-
T-PC
Each of these cases mandated West Virginia's largest 
and second largest ILECs to reduce their traffic sensitive 
intrastate switched access rates to the same level as the 
interstate switched access rates.
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Ohio, Missouri, and Virginia have also instituted measures to reduce intrastate access charges.  
Of these three states Ohio is the closest to the broad reforms of Indiana, Illinois, Tennessee, and 
West Virginia.  Currently, Ohio‟s large incumbent local carriers, AT&T and Frontier, as well as 
all of the competitive local exchange carriers, set their intrastate access charges to mirror their 
interstate access charges.  There is also a current Public Utilities Commission order to investigate 
whether the remaining carriers should reduce their rates as well.  Missouri does not require that 
intrastate and interstate access rates be equal, but in 2010 the state passed legislation which will 
lead to the reduction of intrastate rates.  House Bill 1750 requires the large ILEC‟s to reduce 
their rates annually by six percent of the difference between a company‟s intrastate access rates 
and its interstate access rates.  This reduction will be completed over a three-year period, 
beginning March 1, 2011.  Virginia has not taken such broad measures as the previously 
mentioned surrounding states but has targeted specific providers.  The Virginia State Corporation 
Commission ordered Verizon, Virginia‟s largest telephone company, to reduce its intrastate 
access charges on August 1, 2005 and again on February 1, 2006. 
 
Intrastate access rate reform is not unique to Kentucky and surrounding states.  Many other states 
have also implemented legislation or have opened investigations to form a plan of action, and 
Table 3 contains a summary of selected states.
 12
  Georgia, Kansas, Maine, and Michigan are all 
examples of states that require their providers‟ intrastate access charges to mirror interstate 
access charges.  The Georgia Public Service Commission implemented House Bill 168 in 2010.  
This bill requires ILECs to reduce their intrastate switched access charges to parity with their 
interstate switched access rates by December 31, 2015.  Kansas has required ILECs‟ intrastate 
access rates to be at parity with their interstate access rates since 1996 with the passage of the 
Kansas Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Maine was also a national leader with intrastate 
access rate reduction.  The Maine Public Utilities Commission Statutes required intrastate access 
rates to equal interstate access rates by May 31, 2005.  Michigan passed the Michigan 
Telecommunication Act in 2009, requiring providers to eliminate the differential between 
intrastate and interstate switched toll access service rates by January 1, 2015.  Each of these 
reforms makes it clear that even though the end goal of rate parity is the same, implementation 
time tables and legislative language vary across states. 
 
Similar to Kentucky and the surrounding region, there is variation across states in intrastate 
access charge legislation.  Both California and Wisconsin do not require rate parity, but have still 
taken measures to reform intrastate access charges.  The California Public Utilities Commission 
has made several rulings on revisions to intrastate access charges.  Decision 06-04-071 requires 
the state‟s two largest carriers, AT&T California and Verizon California, as well as SureWest 
and Frontier, to remove the non-cost-based rate elements from intrastate access charges.  
Decision 07-12-020 ordered CLEC‟s to begin setting their access charges at the higher of 
AT&T‟s or Verizon‟s intrastate access charges, plus ten percent.  Wisconsin has also enacted 
legislation to reduce intrastate access charges, but like California the measures taken are not 
nearly as broad as what many other states have implemented.  Wisconsin Act 496 in 1993 
mandated that AT&T set intrastate access rates to mirror interstate access rates.  This is the only 
company that is held to such a standard.  On May 24, 2011, the Wisconsin Telecommunications 
                                                 
12
 For a complete summary of states not selected for Table 3, see the Summary of State Actions on Intrastate Access 
Charges, filed March 14, 2010, Docket No. P-100, Sub 167, Petition of Sprint to Reduce Intrastate Switched Access 
Rates of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers in North Carolina. 
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Modernization Act of 2011 (2011 Wisconsin Act 22) was enacted.  Included in this legislation 
were provisions reforming access charges in the state.  Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker said at 
the time: “This legislation will update Wisconsin‟s regulation of the telephone industry for the 
broadband age.  These reforms will encourage more private sector investment and bring jobs to 
the state.”13 
 
Table 3: Summary of Selected States‟ Intrastate and Interstate Access Charge Parity 
 
* AT&T and Frontier, as well as all of the CLEC‟s, mirror their interstate charges. 
‡ A CLEC can file with the Nevada commission to exceed its FCC rates, but the CLEC must file 
cost support and receive commission approval. 
† AT&T must set intrastate rates to mirror interstate rates. 
 
IV. Underlying Economic Principles 
 
The prices that result from a competitive market process are socially beneficial for the following 
reason.  Competition among sellers leads to prices that reflect the economic costs of supplying a 
product.  Seeing such prices, consumers will choose to purchase products which they value more 
than the cost of producing and will choose not to purchase products which they value less than 
the cost of producing.  Producers will similarly be induced to supply products where consumers‟ 
                                                 
13
 2011 Wisconsin Act 22, the Wisconsin Telecommunications Modernization Act: 
http://nxt.legis.state.wi.us/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&d=billhist&jd=top; and BizTimes.com 
(http://www.biztimes.com/daily/2011/5/12/state-legislature-passes-telecom-deregulation): “State Legislature passes 
telecom deregulation,” May 12, 2011. 
Addressed 
Access Rate 
Reform Access Rate Legislation
Intrastate 
Mirror 
Interstate
No Has not revised access reform since 1999 No
Yes Illinois Public Utilities Act Section 13-900.2 Yes
Yes HEA 1279 Yes
Yes House Bill 1750 No
Yes Case No. 10-2387-TP-COI No*
Yes House Bill 574 Yes
Yes Case No. PUC-2003_00091 No
Yes Case No. 06-1935-T-PC and 05-0040-T-PC Yes
Yes (D.) 07-12-020 and (D.) 06-04-071 No
Yes House Bill 168 Yes
Yes Kansas Telecommunications Act of 1996 Yes
Yes Public Utilities Commission Statute Yes
Yes Michigan Telecommunications Act Yes
Yes Nevada Administrative Code 704.75295 Yes‡
Yes Wisconsin Act 22 Yes†
California
Kentucky
Surrounding States
Illinois
Indiana 
Missouri 
Ohio
Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia
Other States
Georgia
Kansas
Michigan
Nevada
Wisconsin
Maine
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valuations exceed costs, but will not supply products where the price consumers pay does not 
cover production costs.  Such an outcome is deemed economically efficient. 
 
Federal telecommunications policy has economic efficiency as a primary goal.  In the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress directed the FCC and the states to eliminate implicit 
subsidies for universal service contained in access charges and make support for universal 
service explicit instead.
14
  The FCC has explicitly stated that it seeks “an approach to intercarrier 
compensation that will encourage efficient use of, and investment in, telecommunications 
networks, and the efficient development of competition.”15  The FCC‟s pursuit of economic 
efficiency has led to interstate access charges that vary very little across local exchange carriers 
and largely reflect the economic cost of providing origination and termination services. 
 
Because intrastate access charges have remained under the control of state regulatory 
commissions, reform has occurred more slowly and unevenly.  In Kentucky as in some other 
states, intrastate access charges for some ILEC‟s and CLEC‟s are set at levels considerably 
higher than the economic cost of providing origination and termination services to IXC‟s.  These 
above-cost access charges distort the economic decisions of consumers of telecommunication 
services and of other telecommunications providers.  As such, the system of intrastate access 
charges that currently exists in Kentucky is out of step with national telecommunication goals 
and policy.  In 2009 the FCC, directed by Congress, developed the National Broadband Plan 
(NBP).  This plan outlines a course of action toward universal broadband service reaching every 
American.  The NBP explicitly addresses intercarrier compensation (ICC), stating that ICC has 
not been reformed to accommodate changes in technology and consumer behavior.
16
  The plan 
elaborates on several specific economic disincentives, ultimately concluding that “the current 
ICC system is not sustainable in an all-broadband Internet Protocol world.”17 
 
This section of our report provides an overview of the underlying economic principles behind the 
access rate system.  We pay particular attention to how these principles have changed as a result 
of technological innovation.  For example, the access rate system was designed in 1984 in a 
world without wireless or broadband services.  Local telephone companies were natural 
monopolies due to the large costs of laying copper wire for landlines.  Now consumers have 
broadband, wireline and wireless options and the market is very competitive, so this natural 
monopoly on telecommunications no longer exists. 
 
Higher Costs for Consumers 
 
Currently in Kentucky, intrastate access charges exceed the costs to provide access service for 
many local exchange carriers.  These excessive charges generate positive profits for the access 
provider, the local telephone company.  However, the excessive charges raise the costs of inter-
exchange carriers providing long-distance service who have to pay these access fees.  The IXC‟s 
                                                 
14
 Federal Communications Commission. September 2010. Trends in Telephone Service. Industry Analysis and 
Technology Division Wireline Competition Bureau, p. 14. 
15
 Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, April 2001, p. 3. 
16
 Federal Communications Commission. March 2010. Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan. p. 142.  
Hereafter “National Broadband Plan” 
17
 National Broadband Plan, p. 142. 
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have to include these charges in the prices they charge consumers for intrastate long-distance 
service.  Consequently, consumers end up paying higher prices for intrastate long-distance 
calls—prices that do not reflect economic costs.  As a result, consumers are inefficiently induced 
to substitute away from landline-to-landline calls handled by an IXC, and end up using other 
calling options such as wireless or VoIP instead. 
 
If intrastate access charges were reduced to a level that reflected economic costs, intrastate long-
distance prices would fall.  There is considerable competition among IXC‟s to provide intrastate 
long-distance service, and IXC‟s also compete with wireless providers for many intrastate calls.  
Competition among firms leads to prices that reflect costs.  A reduction in input costs will lead to 
lower prices being charged by IXC‟s for intrastate long-distance service.  In other words, a 
reduction in access charges would lead to a reduction in consumers‟ intrastate long-distance 
rates.  Such a reduction occurred for interstate long-distance calls after the FCC reduced 
interstate access charges in the 1990s. 
 
Testimony from Dr. Debra J. Aron before the Arizona Corporation Commission supports the 
conclusions regarding reduced intrastate access charges.  Dr. Aron recommended that both 
ILECs and CLECs of Arizona reduce their intrastate rates to “the levels and structure of their 
corresponding interstate switched access rates.”18 
 
Consumers will also benefit indirectly as a result of reductions in intrastate long-distance costs 
incurred by businesses.  When businesses have to pay more for long-distance calls, they pass 
these higher costs on to consumers by charging higher prices for the products they sell.  The 
amount of the reduction in price by any particular business would depend on how important 
long-distance communication is in its total cost of production.  For example, a large automotive 
plant in Kentucky often calls its suppliers in the state to coordinate deliveries and other logistical 
issues that are crucial to the success of the automotive plant.  As the price of a long-distance call 
rises, the plant may call its suppliers less often and suffer production delays and other negative 
consequences.  In an extreme case, they may consider relocating just outside Kentucky in a 
neighboring state in order to reduce their long-distance telephone costs. 
 
Thus, a reduction in access charges would lead to lower prices for intrastate long-distance 
services, as well as potentially lower prices for other goods whose input prices include intrastate 
long-distance calls.   
 
Reduced Competition 
 
Artificially high access charges reduce competition in the intrastate long-distance market.  
Currently, wireless phone operators generally have lower intrastate access charges than wireline 
phone operators.  In fact, most wireless phone calls in Kentucky would be considered “local” 
calls because they are made within the same Major Trading Area (MTA), which is the local 
                                                 
18
 Aron, Debra J. testimony before the Arizona Corporation Commission, Docket Nos. RT-00000H-97-0137 and T-
00000D-00-0672, December 2009.  
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service area for wireless calls.
19
  The substantial disparities in access rates paid by wireline 
versus wireless carriers create a competitive advantage for wireless long-distance services. 
 
Because wireless companies have lower access charges, they are able to offer substantially lower 
prices for intrastate long-distance calls.  If the cost that an ILEC or CLEC incurs in providing 
local exchange access for wireless were lower than for wireline long-distance providers, then this 
outcome would be efficient.  But charging higher access charges for the same access 
functionality puts the wireline long-distance carriers at a competitive disadvantage for no reason 
related to relative efficiency or value of service provided.  When some companies are favored 
vis-à-vis other companies by regulatory rules that are unrelated to underlying costs of doing 
business, the result is economically inefficient.  In this case, the inefficiency means that wireline 
long-distance carriers are less competitive than wireless long-distance carriers due to the higher 
access fees paid by wireline carriers.   
 
Consequently, people make fewer wireline long-distance calls due to the artificially high access 
rates, resulting in a “deadweight” or inefficiency loss.  The amount of the deadweight loss is the 
value to consumers from the wireline long-distance calls they would have preferred to make on 
their wireline network, but that were made in another way or not at all due to the excessive 
access charges.  There is suggestive evidence to support that this may be occurring in Kentucky, 
discussed earlier in this report.  The number of wireline phone lines in Kentucky has decreased 
by 21.5% while the number of wireless subscriptions has increased by 11% from the end of 2007 
to June 2010. 
 
Inefficient Investment 
 
Another economic concern is that the current access charge system leads to inefficient 
investment in the present and the future.  Specifically, it leads to over-investment in landline 
technologies and under-investment in broadband and wireless technologies.  AT&T argues that, 
over time, such inefficient investment will put the state of Kentucky at a competitive 
disadvantage for economic development relative to other states with more efficient access 
charges.
20
  At the national level, several companies have made similar claims to the FCC that 
artificially high access charges discourage the adoption of broadband technology.
21
 
 
For example, the current access charge scheme provides the perverse incentive for local carriers 
to continue to invest in low-quality timed-division multiplexing (TDM) networks that are ill-
equipped for handling broadband-based traffic rather than investing in networks than are equally 
adept at voice and broadband traffic.  In an extreme example, one provider is forced to convert 
its broadband-based voice traffic into lower-quality “traditional” voice traffic so that a local 
carrier can collect access charges.
22
 
 
                                                 
19
 See http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/mta.pdf for a map of MTAs in the U.S.  As mentioned previously, 
Kentucky has four MTAs, but most of the state‟s population is covered in a single MTA (number 26 in the map). 
20
 AT&T 2010. 
21
 National Broadband Plan. 
22
 National Broadband Plan, page 142. 
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The greatest concern about infrastructure investment comes from smaller companies, often based 
in rural areas.  These companies argue that, in fact, a reduction in access charges would reduce 
rather than increase broadband development.  However, Beard and Ford (2008) develop a simple 
economic model showing that reduced charges would actually lead to greater broadband 
deployment rather than lower deployment.
23
  They also note that some of the equipment used for 
handling broadband traffic does not rely on large economies of scale, so that small, rural systems 
would not suffer a large cost disadvantage due to the small number of customers using the 
service.  Furthermore, Aron and Ingraham (2011) have documented a positive relationship 
between the price of local telephone service and broadband adoption even after accounting for 
broadband availability.
24
  In other words, people with low prices for local telephone service are 
less likely to have broadband than otherwise similar individuals with higher prices for local 
telephone service. 
 
Because the current system provides local carriers with access fees often well in excess of costs, 
local carriers have reduced incentive to provide broadband access that could potentially compete 
with its local wireline service, thereby decreasing revenues from these access fees.  AT&T 
argues that the current access charge system provides incentives for “carriers to cling to the 
traditional voice model, discouraging broadband adoption.”25  Free Press, a consumer advocacy 
group, states that the current access charge system produces a “strong incentive for rural carriers 
to delay the full transition to the broadband world.”26 
 
Another potential impediment to investment is the uncertainty regarding future access charges.  
For example, state regulatory agencies and the FCC have not decided the appropriate access fee 
structure for VoIP calls.  Thus, it seems inevitable that access charges will eventually change, 
and they will likely be set at or close to economic costs.  Such changes should clarify the 
regulatory environment and therefore reduce the disincentive to investment that exists under the 
current climate of uncertainty. 
 
Finally, there is a concern that companies will choose to invest in other states with lower long-
distance charges than Kentucky.   
 
Arbitrage Opportunities 
 
An additional economic inefficiency of the current access charge system is that it creates 
arbitrage opportunities by charging different prices for essentially the same product.  Because 
local access providers receive access charges significantly above their costs, they have an 
incentive to increase the volume of intrastate long-distance calls.  It would be very lucrative for 
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 T. Randolph Beard and George S. Ford, “Do High Call Termination Rates Deter Broadband Deployment?” 
Phoenix Center Policy Bulletin No. 22, October 2008.  Hereafter, “Phoenix Center Bulletin, 2008.” 
24
 Debra J. Aron and Allan Ingraham, “The Effects of Legacy Pricing Regulation on Adoption of Broadband Service 
in the United States,” Industrial Organization: Regulation Antitrust, and Privatization eJournal, Volume 3, Number 
75, May 10, 2011. 
25
 Letter from Brian Benison, AT&T, to Marelene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 01-92 and 96-45, 
WC Docket Nos. 05-337, 99-68, 07-135 (Aug. 5, 2008), Attachment at 2, as quoted in Phoenix Center Bulletin 
2008. 
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 Letter from Ben Scott, Free Press, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket Nos. 96-45 and 01-92, 
WC Docket Nos. 05-337 and 06-122 (Oct. 13, 2008), at 2, 5, as quoted in Phoenix Center Bulletin 2008. 
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local access providers to identify or even create businesses within their service areas that receive 
large numbers of intrastate long-distance calls.  The local access provider would make a profit by 
generating these calls.  A fictitious example would be for an access provider to set up a UK 
basketball chat line.  The access provider might give the chat line an extremely low, if not zero, 
price for local service.  In addition, the access provider could even pay the chat line a fee or 
share of the access margin to make the chat line its customer.  Sometimes arbitrage-based 
businesses like the hypothetical chat line are referred to as “call-pumping” schemes because they 
use arbitrage opportunities like that created by the access fee differential to create business. 
 
An additional perverse economic effect of the differences in interstate and intrastate access 
charges is that they create incentives for access providers to misclassify calls as intrastate even if 
they may actually be interstate or local.  Similarly, long-distance carriers have incentives to 
misclassify calls as interstate rather than intrastate.  As a consequence, scarce resources must be 
devoted to the process of identifying and classifying wireline calls.  Mechanisms must be 
established for identifying whether wireline traffic is intrastate or interstate.  Phone call data 
must be reviewed to ensure that calls are not intentionally or accidentally misclassified.  Disputes 
over phone call classifications must be resolved.
27
 
 
The bottom line is that arbitrage opportunities resulting from differential intrastate and interstate 
access charges result in wasteful spending of public and private resources that could be avoided. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
Kentucky is one of several states where intrastate long-distance access charges in many cases are 
substantially higher than interstate long-distance access charges even though the two services 
provided are identical.  A number of states have taken steps to bring these two access charges 
closer to parity.  In fact, all of Kentucky‟s neighboring states require at least some companies to 
lower their intrastate access charges to match their interstate access charges.  Many states such as 
Indiana require similar rates for all ILECs.  In April 2011, Tennessee enacted legislation 
requiring parity in rates by 2016. 
 
There are economically sound reasons why two products with similar functionality and similar 
costs—intrastate and interstate long-distance connection services to local exchanges—should 
have similar prices.  Higher access charges lead to higher prices for intrastate long-distance 
services, as well as higher prices for other goods whose production processes require intrastate 
long-distance communication.  Inefficiently high access charges reduce competition in the 
intrastate long-distance market. 
 
Another economic concern is that the current access charge system leads to suboptimal 
investment in the present and the future.  A final economic inefficiency of the current access 
charge system is that it creates arbitrage opportunities by charging different prices for essentially 
the same product, resulting in wasteful spending that could be avoided. 
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 See, for example, “Complaint of Sprint Communications Company LP against Brandenburg Telephone Company 
and Request for Expedited Relief,” before the Kentucky Public Service Commission, Case No. 2008-00135. 
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Furthermore, a proactive effort to reform access charges in Kentucky would allow for a 
collaborative development process that includes all stakeholders in the existing system, allowing 
rural local exchange carriers a significant ability to assist in the crafting of new regulation that 
benefits all parties.  The implicit subsidy system is not sustainable, because implicit subsidies are 
not the price signals the market needs and result in the erosion of long distance usage, thereby 
further reducing the implicit subsidies themselves upon which rural LECs depend.  In addition, 
the shift in technology to other methods of communication such as wireless voice service, VoIP, 
and various forms of e-communication continues to move consumers away from a non-access 
charge mechanism, a fact noted by the FCC in the National Broadband Plan.
28
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